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VOLUME XXXIX MAY 1965 NUMBER 2
DEDUCTION OF EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES BY
LAWYERS AND LAW STUDENTS AS ORDINARY
AND NECESSARY BUSINESS EXPENSES
CLAmcn M. DUNNAVzllE, JR. -
Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets,
like the good will of an old partnership. . .
For many, they are the only tools with which to
hew a pathway to success. The money spent in
acquiring them is well and wisely spent. It is not
an ordinary eapense of the operation of a business.
-Mr. Justice Cardozo'
IN RECENT YEARS, there has developed an increasing
tendency among taxpayers to claim a deduction for tui-
tion and other expenses incurred in obtaining an education
as ordinary and necessary business expenses. This is largely
because the regulations under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 have liberalized the previous strict requirements and
also because the courts have become more liberal in allowing
deductions for educational expenses.
The purpose of this article is to focus on the extent to
which educational expenses incurred by the lawyer and law
student may be allowed as deductions from income taxes
under the 1954 Code. This article will analyze the majority
tLL.B., St. J'ohn's University School of Law; Member of the Federal
Bar and the New York Bar; Admitted to Practice before the United
States Supreme Court and the United States Tax Court.1 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115-16 (1933).
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of the cases in the area and point out the lack of uniformity
among the decisions.
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE AND REGULATIONS
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 pro-
vides that, "there shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. .... "
Thus, a taxpayer who is engaged in a business is allowed
to deduct all ordinary and necessary business expenses pro-
vided, of course, that the expenses are reasonable in amounts,
and provided that the expenses proximately result from the
conduct of the taxpayer's trade or business.' Whether ex-
penses are ordinary and necessary business expenses are
usually questions of fact to be determined on the basis of
each case.'
Prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, most expenses
for education and learning were held to be personal ex-
penses 4 not deductible from income for income tax pur-
poses." However, the regulations under Section 162 of the
1954 Code 6 have adopted a more liberal view with respect
to the deductibility of expenses for education. Expenses
2 Appeal of Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924), cited with approval in Korn-
hauser v. Commissioner, 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
3 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
In Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940), which arose under
§23(a) of the Revenue Act of 1928, the Supreme Court stated the test
as to what constitutes an "ordinary" business expense: "Ordinary has the
connotation of normal, usual or customary. To be sure, an expense may be
ordinary though it happen but once in the taxpayer's lifetime. Cf. Korn-
hauwer v. United States. . . . Yet the transaction which gives rise to it must
be of common or frequent occurrence in the type of business involved.
Welch v. Helvering. . . . Hence, the fact that a particular expense would
be an ordinary or common one in the course of one business and so de-
ductible under § 23(a) does not necessarily make it such in connection with
another business." The Court expressly noted that in order to be de-
ductible the expense must be both ordinary and necessary. Necessary ex-
penses may be defined as those expenses which business exigencies force the
taxpayer to incur. See Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1945).
4 Welch v. Helvering, sapra note 1; I.T. 4044, 1951-1 CuM. BULL. 16.5 Treas. Reg. 118, §§39.23(a)-15(f) provided:
"Among expenditures not allowable . . . are . . . expenses of taking
special courses and training" [the Treasury Regulations are hereinafter cited
as Regs.].
6Regs. § 1.162-5(b) (1958).
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incurred to acquire knowledge for its own sake in order to
fulfill one's general educational aspirations, or for possible
use in some work which might be started in the future, are
clearly not deductible. However, the present regulations I
provide that if the education is undertaken primarily for
the purpose of maintaining and improving skills required by
the taxpayer in his employment, or to meet the express re-
quirements of his employer, or the requirements of applicable
law or regulations imposed as a condition to the retention of
his salary, status or employment, the expenses may be
deducted.8
In short, pursuant to the regulations under the 1954
Code, the cost of education may be deducted if undertaken
to maintain or improve the taxpayer's skills which are re-
quired in his employment or by his employer or which
satisfy a condition required to retain the taxpayer's status
or employment. The difficulty, however, is to determine
whether an educational expenditure was actually incurred
for the purpose of maintaining and improving skills or
merely to fulfill general educational aspirations or to qualify
for a new profession.
7 For the convenience of the practitioner the full text of Regs. § 1.162-5
is set forth in Appendix A infra.
s The regulations were adopted on April! 3, 1958, effective for 1954 and
later years. In order to give full retroactive effect to these regulations,
Congress enacted § 96 of the Technical Amendments Act of 195& to extend
the time for filing claims for refunds under the new regulations. In S. REP.
No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1958) the following statement is made:
"The Internal Revenue Service long held that relatively few educational
expenses were deductible as business expenses, or as expenses incurred in the
production of income. Generally, the Service had held that for such ex-
penses to be deductible they must be required as a condition to the retention
by the taxpayer of his present employment. On April 4, 1958, however, the
Treasury Department in a news release announced that it was issuing final
regulations which were more liberal than the regulation previously in force,
in that the expenses incurred by a teacher for education could be deducted
even though they were incurred voluntarily and even though the courses
taken carried academic credit or resulted in an increase in salary or in a
promotion. The news release also indicated that this change was made in
order to remove the distinction previously drawn between self-employed per-
sons and employees, such as teachers. The final regulations issued on April
5, 1958, provided that expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education
are deductible if they are for education (including research activities) under-
taken to maintain or improve skills required by the taxpayer in his employ-
ment or in his trade or business ....
"Your committee is pleased with the more liberal interpretation by the
Internal Revenue Service of what constitutes deductible educational expenses."
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Although the regulations have been in effect for seven
years,' considerable confusion still exists as to the circum-
stances under which educational expenses may be deducted,
It would appear from the regulations that the determination
of whether or not educational expenses are deductible in a
particular case necessarily depends upon such considerations
as: a) the nature of the requirements of the taxpayer's busi-
ness or profession; b) the particular skills required to be uti-
lized; c) the requirements of the taxpayer's employer; d)
the custom in the profession or business; e) the nature of
the particular expenses sought to be deducted; and f) the
taxpayer's actual purpose in undertaking the education.
Revenue Ruling 60-97 10 contains a number of examples
explaining situations in which educational expenses are de-
ductible by taxpayers generally. The full text of the examples
contained in the revenue ruling is printed as an appendix
to this article, infra p. 274-. Needless to say, the examples
do not furnish the sole guide. Since each case must turn
on its own facts, 1 it is difficult to provide a hard and fast
rule as to the specific instances under which educational ex-
penses are deductible.
This article is concerned only with educational expenses
incurred by lawyers and law students. A perusal of the lead-
ing cases in this specific area, however, may be helpful to
the practitioner in determining the possibility of a deduc-
tion being allowed for educational expenses in any course of
study.
THE CASFs
The cases which have arisen regarding deductions
claimed by lawyers or law students for educational expenses
may be classified into two primary categories:
(a) Cases in which deductions are claimed by lawyers
for educational expenses incurred in taking "re-
9 The regulations were proposed on July 10, 1956 and were adopted on
April 3, 1958. 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 63.
10 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 69.
11Regs. §1.162-5(a)(2); Welsh v. United States, 329 F.2d 145 (6th
Cir. 1964); Condit v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964).
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fresher" courses, and courses taken to stay abreast
of developments in the legal profession or to im-
prove skills required in their present profession.
(b) Cases in which deductions are claimed by law stu-
dents for courses leading to a degree while enrolled
in law school which qualify the taxpayer for a new
profession as a lawyer.
Courses for Maintaining and Improving Skills
The legal profession, perhaps more so than any other
profession, requires continuous study and learning. Laws
change frequently. Therefore, in order to properly advise
his clients, the lawyer must stay abreast of these changes.
Moreover, many lawyers continue to enlarge their legal
education after their fundamental training is complete.
Often this entails taking special courses and training at
considerable expense to the practitioner. Such expenses
should be deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses
incurred in the practice of law.
Even prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit indicated that when
the information acquired is needed for use in the lawyer's
established practice, the expenses are properly deductible.
In Coughlin v,. Commissioner,12 a practicing attorney spe-
cializing in taxation incurred expenses for tuition, travel,
board and lodging while attending the Annual Institute on
Federal Taxation conducted in New York City under the
sponsorship of New York 'University. The court allowed
deduction of the expenses-relying upon Hill v. Commis-
sioner,3 wherein the expenses incurred by a school teacher
in attending summer school were held deductible. Consist-
ently, the case of Bistline v. United States" held that an
attorney who traveled with his wife ta New York City where
he enrolled in a two-week course in federal taxation, was
12203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).
13 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950). This case presaged the liberal attitude
expressed in the present regulations. Prior to Hill, educational expense de-
ductions were generally disallowed. See notes 4 and 5 .upra.
14 145 F. Supp. 802 (D. Idaho 1956), aff'd on other grounds, 260 F.2d
80 (9th Cir. 1958).
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entitled to deduct his travel expenses to New York, the
hotel expenses while attending the institute and the expenses
incurred for tuition and books, even though he also attended
the Lions Convention while in New York.
On the other hand, however, in the tax court case of
Joseph T. Booth, III,"5 the taxpayer had engaged in private
practice for a short time and then accepted a state govern-
ment position as legal advisor to the Governor. Subsequently
he determined to form a partnership and return to private
practice. During the discussions leading to the formation
of the partnership, all the partners agreed that some member
of the firm should obtain a more detailed knowledge of the
law of federal taxation, with the understanding that the
partner who took this training would not devote himself
exclusively to tax matters. By mutual agreement the tax-
payer was selected to attend New York University to pursue
courses in taxation. The taxpayer shared in the profits of
the firm while pursuing his tax studies, and after returning
to the firm did not practice in the tax field exclusively but
used his tax knowledge in a general practice. The court held
that the taxpayer's education in the law of taxation was
undertaken primarily for the purpose of becoming a partner
in the firm, which, for the taxpayer, was a new position,
"even though he engaged in the same profession, the
practice of law."
Although the tax court stated that the Coughlin case
was "clearly" distinguishable since there the taxpayer was
not qualifying for a new profession, it seems difficult to
reconcile Booth with Coughlin and Bistline. In Booth, the
taxpayer was already a practicing attorney and it appears
from the opinion that he attended New York University
merely for the purpose of improving his skills as a lawyer.
He did not become a "tax lawyer" as such. 16 Is the situation
1535 T.C. 1144 (1961).
16 Compare John S. Watson, 31 T.C. 1014 (1959), where after a number
of years of practicing medicine, the taxpayer, an internist, decided to obtain
training in analysis and the techniques of psychiatry. The taxpayer engaged
in a course of psychiatry and a total of 225 hours work was taken. The
taxpayer did not become a psychiatrist, but used this training in the practice
of medicine as an internist. The court allowed the expenses incurred in
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where an attorney who is not a specialist, but takes courses
in a specialty to improve his skills as a general practitioner
distinguishable from a case where a specialist takes such
courses? It is submitted that there should be no such dis-
tinction. Indeed, the regulations appear to support the
allowance of "Booth-type" expenses as deductions."7  How-
ever, the tax court did not reach this point in Booth, since
it found that the purpose for undertaking the studies was
to qualify for a new position-that of partner of a newly
formed law firm.
The cases discussed above involved situations where
the lawyer was attempting to maintain or improve skills in
a profession already acquired. Tnder the regulations these
expenses are properly deductible. Education expenses, how-
ever, are expressly not deductible where the course of study
is designed to acquire skills for a new profession."' Never-
theless, some lawyers have claimed as deductions the entire
expenses incurred in law school for studies leading to a
Bachelor of Laws degree.
Courses Leading to an LL.B. Degree
In a number of recent cases, the entire tuition and
expenses incurred in becoming a lawyer have been claimed
as deductions. In a considerable number of these cases it
undertaking the psychiatric studies as an ordinary and necessary business
expense. The tax court distinguished Watson in Booth) on the ground that
the taxpayer in Booth was seeking a new position-i.e., a partnership in a
law firm.
The regulations provide that if education is required to meet the minimum
requirements for qualification or establishment in an intended trade or business
or specialty therein, the expenses of such education is not deductible. Regs.
§ 1.162-5(b). Thus, if the taxpayer became a tax specialist under the facts
of this case, the educational expenses would not be allowable under the
regulations.
17 Regs. § 1.162-5 (e), example (2). It is interesting to note that Booth
was decided after the promulgation of the regulations.
18 The cases discussed herein involve the acquisition of law degrees. It
should be observed that the same general principles are applicable to tourses
leading to other degrees. See, e.g., Knut F. Larsen, 15 T.C. 956 (1950)
(mechanic who sought engineering degree) ; Robert M. Kamins, 25 T.C. 1238
(1956) (research associate seeking Ph.D.). Compare Deveraux v. Commis-
sioner, 292 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1961), with Marlor v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d
615 (2d Cir. 1958) (college teachers pursuing Ph.D.).
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appears that the taxpayers have been unsuccessful. 19 How-
ever, a number of lawyers and law students succeeded in
obtaining the deductions claimed °.20 Most of these cases have
involved persons who attended law school at night while
holding other positions during the day. Before considering
some of these cases it should be noted that under the present
case law a student attending law school at night may be
able to deduct his entire law school expenses, including tui-
tion, books and other related expenses, provided that he
can show a direct connection between the expenditures and
his "daytime" profession or position. If the student travels
away from home he may deduct his expenditures for travel
and the cost of his meals and lodging under the authority
of Regulation § 1.162-5(d). Commuter expenses are not
deductible under Regulation § 1.162-5(b). However, it
might be inferable from the examples contained in Regula-
tion § 1.162-5(e) that such expenses may be properly
deducted.
Students attending law school at night can hardly be
considered a different species from their counterparts attend-
ing law school during the day. Both, upon receiving their
degrees and passing their bar examinations, are entitled
to the same privileges and are held to the same standards
as all attorneys, irrespective of whether they actually prac-
tice. Indeed, many students attend a "daytime" law course,
not to prepare for actual practice, but to acquire a legal
background which can be utilized in business affairs. In
19 Lawyers or law students were unsuccessful in deducting their expenses
incurred in law school in the following cases: Sandt & Hines v. Commissioner,
303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962); James J. Condit, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1306
(1962), aff'd, 329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964) (per curiam); John Lezdey, 23
CCH Tax Ct Mem. 485 (1964); Robert H. Montgomery, 23 CCH Tax Ct
Mere. 599 (1964); David H. Pfeffer, 22 CCH Tax Ct Mean. 785 (1963);
Gilmore C. Gulbranson, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1022 (1963); James J. Engel,
21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 909 (1962); Louis Aronin, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mern.
1302 (1961); Anthony E. Spitaleri, 32 T.C. 988 (1959).2 0Lawyers or law students were successful in deducting law school
expenses in the following cases: Welsh v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 597
(N.D. Ohio 1962), aff'd, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964); Milton L. Schultz,
23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1372 (1964); Richard M. Baum, 23 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 206 (1964); Walter F. Charlton, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 420 (1964);
Donald P. Frazee, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mene. 1086 (1963); Williams v. United
States, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cal. 9263 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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this regard, one may question the fairness of some of the
decisions allowing deductions to the student attending law
school at night. All students who are admitted to the bar
are lawyers. Whether they are accountants, revenue agents
or clerks when they take the bar examination, they all
become lawyers and therefore should receive the same tax
treatment. The following cases shed light on this inconsis-
tency.
In James J. Condit,2 an Ohio accountant claimed a
deduction for expenditures he incurred for tuition, textbooks
and supplies while attending law school at night. Condit
received a law degree and was admitted to the bar, although
he continued to work for the same employer as an account-
ant. The taxpayer claimed that the expenses which he in-
curred in attending law school were ordinary and necessary
expenses required to maintain and improve skills required
in his employment as an accountant. The deduction was
disallowed by the tax court and the court of appeals affirmed
on the ground that the tax court's conclusion on factual
issues was binding.
The tax court found that the primary purpose in pur-
suing the legal studies was to qualify to meet the minimum
standards for a new profession. The court based its conclu-
sion primarily on the fact that the taxpayer's questionnaire,
required as part of his application to the Ohio bar, contained
the following:
Do you wish to adopt the l~gal profession as a life work?
Yes....
State in a general way the plans for your future in the legal
profession: to combine my present background in accounting with
law and develop along lines of Corporate Taxation and Corporate
Law.
The court noted that even though the taxpayer intended
to remain with his employer, this would not necessarily be
the equivalent of remaining in his same position, since his
21CCH Tax Ct. Mern. 1306 (1962), aff'd, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964)
(per curiam).
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duties might become that of a lawyer for his employer, and
that his testimony in explanation of his answers to the
questionnaire "indicates that this is his own interpretation
of his stated intention."
A diametrically opposite result was reached in Welsh
v. United States,22 where another Ohio taxpayer, who was
a revenue agent with the Internal Revenue Service, claimed
a deduction for his tuition and expenses for attending law
school. Welsh had enrolled as a candidate for an LL.B. de-
gree and, like Condit, also studied law at night while working
during the day. However, on July 4, 1960, shortly after he
was admitted to the Ohio bar, Welsh resigned from the
Revenue Service and entered the private practice of law
in Cleveland.
Welsh had also made statements in his application for
admission to the bar that he intended to practice law2 but
the court found as a fact that the primary intention of
Welsh in undertaking his legal education was to maintain
and improve the skills required in his employment with the
Revenue Service. Apparently, the only evidence offered by
the taxpayer was his testimony, which the court adopted
as true. The court apparently did not give much weight to
the fact that the taxpayer had stated in his law school
application and in his application for admission to the bar
that he intended to practice law. Nor did it give much weight
to the fact that he left the Revenue Service within a month
after he was admitted to the bar. Instead, the deduction was
allowed in full by the district court. The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the issue was
solely one of fact, and there was substantial evidence to
support the findings of the district court.
Earlier, the tax court in James J. Engel," a case "on
all fours" with Welsh, had denied a deduction to still an-
other Ohio taxpayer who was also employed by the Internal
Revenue Service as an agent. Like Welsh, Engel enrolled in
22210 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964).23The statement made by Welsh is not reproduced in the opinion, but
is referred to in the district court's opinion at 210 F. Supp. 599.
2421 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1302 (1962).
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law school in a course at night leading to a Bachelor of
Laws degree. He also filed an application with the Supreme
Court of Ohio, which contained the question: "Do you wish
to adopt the legal profession as a life work"; to which he
replied, "Yes." Welsh, it is to be remembered, had answered
a similar questionnaire.25 Engel claimed that his superiors
had actually encouraged him to study law and that the
primary reason for incurring the expenses was to maintain
and improve his skills as a revenue agent. Moreover, Engel's
superiors testified that a knowledge of the law would be
helpful to him in his work. Engel was duly admitted to the
Ohio bar, but, unlike Welsh, he remained with the Revenue
Service thereafter.
The tax court held that Engel had failed to establish
that his primary purpose in pursuing his law school studies
was to maintain and improve his skills as a revenue agent,
and the deduction was therefore disallowed. Ironically,
Engel, who remained with the Revenue Service in the same
job, was disallowed the deduction, whereas Welsh, who left
the service one month after he was admitted to the bar
and commenced to practice law, was allowed the claimed
deduction in full. This is indicative of the great confusion
in the area which has been referred to previously. This
confusion is further muddled by the result in the case of
Schultz v. Commissioner.26
There the taxpayer was an Internal Revenue Service
Agent, in the Estate and Gift Tax Group, at Houston,
Texas. Schultz successfully deducted expenses which he in-
curred in law school. The only significant factual distinction
between Schultz on the one hand and Welsh and Engel
on the other is that in Schultz's interview before the Houston
Bar Association's Sub-committee on Legal Education, he
stated that his intention at that time was not to practice
law upon admission to the bar. The court justified the de-
duction by stating that the evidence supported the taxpayer's
contention that his primary reason for undertaking the
legal education had been the desire to improve the skills
25 See note 23 supra.
2023 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 1372 (1964).
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required in his position as an Internal Revenue Agent as-
signed to the Estate and Gift Tax Group. Despite the fact
that the very same contention was made by Engel and
Welsh, the court allowed the deduction in Welsh, but dis-
allowed it in Engel. This points up the statement made
earlier that each case is to be decided on its own particular
facts. In this light the issue of credibility is crucial.1
In the case of Walter F. Charlton 28 the taxpayer became
a full-time employee of an accounting firm in 1952 and three
years later became a certified public accountant. His duties
consisted of audits, preparation of tax returns, conferences
with Internal Revenue Service representatives, and manage-
ment engineering. In 1955 he entered law school on his
father's advice that it would assist him in the practice of
public accounting. In a written statement to the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, the taxpayer attested that the
legal education was undertaken for "the purpose of acquiring
knowledge in the tax field." The taxpayer took bar examina-
tions, qualified, and was admitted to practice before various
courts. He did not use the legend "Attorney at Law" on his
door although he did have some stationery printed up identi-
fying him as an attorney. He used this stationery, however,
only once (on a non-legal matter). After being admitted to
the bar he carried on substantially the same duties of a
certified public accountant as he had before entering law
school.
The tax court noted as a common fact that many ac-
counting matters are tied up with the law and that many
certified public accountants are members of the bar. It also
found as fact that the taxpayer's intent was to acquire the
legal education to improve his skill as an accountant. How-
ever, the tax court in Condit, an earlier tax court case,
apparently refused to judicially note that accounting matters
were sufficiently tied up with the law so as to justify a
deduction for legal education expenses. 29  The dichotomous
27 See note 23 'pra.
2823 CCH Tax Ct Mein. 420 (1964).
29As pointed out in Kornhauser v. Commissioner, 276 U.S. 145 (1928),
in order to be deductible, the expenses must proximately result from the
conduct of the taxpayer's trade or business.
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result in these two cases should serve to warn a practitioner
who represents a client claiming such a deduction that unless
he can show a sufficient nexus between the client's previous
profession and the study of the law, the expenses will be
disallowed as a deduction. Moreover, as stated earlier, the
expenses must proximately result from the taxpayer's present
profession or business before a deduction will be allowed.
In Gilmore C. (ulbranson,'0 the taxpayer was employed
by a lawyer who was also engaged in insurance and real
estate brokerage, the rendering of tax service, and a general
real estate business. Taxpayer was hired (as a college gradu-
ate with some experience in the insurance and business ad-
ministration fields) to work primarily on insurance matters.
The taxpayer, however, also worked as a law clerk whenever
needed. In his tax return the taxpayer listed his occupation
as "Insurance, Real Estate and Legal Clerk." He then en-
tered law school and was dismissed because of unsatisfactory
scholarship, although he subsequently made formal appli-
cation for readmission. The taxpayer conceded that when he
first entered law school he intended to get a degree and take
the bar examination, but did not intend to practice law.
In his formal application for readmission, however, the
taxpayer indicated his desire to practice law in the future.
The court found that the taxpayer's employer did not
require his enrollment at a law school as a condition of his
employment or salary. Instead the court found that the
taxpayer was originally hired on the basis of his prior ex-
perience in insurance work-not for legal matters. The
deduction was therefore disallowed.
The decision in the Gulbranson case appears to correctly
apply the rules laid down in the regulations. The law student
was hired as a college graduate, with some experience in
insurance and business administration, to work as an in-
surance, real estate and legal clerk. He attended law school
obviously because he wanted to become a lawyer-a new
profession. The deduction claimed for his law school ex-
penses was therefore properly disallowed. However, if law
school expenses may be deducted at all, does it not appear
8o22 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 1022 (1963).
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to be more logical to allow a law clerk, working for a prac-
ticing lawyer, to deduct his legal education expenses than
for an accountant to deduct such expenses? Although the
tax court found in the Charlton case that many accounting
matters are tied up with the law, it is submitted that if an
accountant who is also a lawyer renders -legal opinions, in
such cases he is acting as a lawyer and not as an accountant
and is using his legal training in the practice of law
rather than accounting.
Likewise, if an insurance adjuster who is also a lawyer
uses his legal skills in performing his duties as an insurance
adjuster, he may also to some extent be engaging in the
practice of law. Thus, he may be called upon by his employer
to perform duties which a non-lawyer insurance adjuster
could not perform. In Richa4'd M. Baum, 1 the tax court al-
lowed a deduction for costs in attending an evening law school
when the taxpayer was an insurance claims adjuster whose
duties involved him in constant contact with legally-oriented
problems such as interpreting contracts and consulting with
claimants' attorneys, even though the acquisition of the legal
education qualified the taxpayer for a new profession. The
court noted that he had no intention of leaving his insurance
company employer especially since he had accumulated
certain retirement benefits and had acquired some degree
of seniority. The court found that his primary purpose in
attending law school was to maintain and improve the skill
required of him as a claims adjuster. Again, it is submitted
that if an adjuster performs essentially legal tasks, he is,
in effect, practicing law - a new profession. At the very
least, he is in the position of one who has acquired a new
status within his present position, i.e., a claims adjuster who
is a lawyer. Hence, the legal education expenses should not
be deductible.2
a'23 CCH Tax Ct Memn 206 (1964).32 Regs. § 1.162-5(b) provides that a deduction will be disallowed if the
educational expenses are undertaken primarily to acquire a substantial ad-
vancement in position. A claims adjuster who is a lawyer and can perform
legal tasks can hardly be considered in the same professional category as a
claims adjuster without such ability. Certainly, a lawyer-adjuster will be
delegated more responsible tasks and will be entitled to a greater salary and
more prestige commensurate with this greater responsibility. See also ex-
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The decision reached in the case of Donald P. Frazee,3
is perhaps one of the most strained interpretations of the
regulations regarding the deductibility of education expenses.
The taxpayer, as a senior in high school, had been hired
by the Government as a mail clerk. While employed by the
Government, he had completed his high school education and
then gone on to college at night. He spent a total of nine
years attending college at night, and in January 1957 re-
ceived his Bachelor of Science degree in business education.
Shortly after completing his college education (in Septem-
ber 1957), Frazee enrolled in law school at night. He com-
pleted law school in 1961, receiving a Bachelor of Laws
degree. At the time when the trial was reached he had
taken one bar examination without success and stated that
he planned to take the examination again in the near future.
Over the years, the taxpayer had from time to time
obtained positions of greater responsibility with the Govern-
ment. By the time of trial, he had reached grade 14 and
was a Supervisory Industrial Specialist in maintenance engi-
neering. Frazee's duties with the Government at the time
he enrolled in law school included the development and
drafting of regulations, preparation of policy and procedural
documents on aircraft, missiles, and weapons systems, and
preparation of replies to congressional inquiries. He had
also assisted the Defense Department in opposing certain
legislation which was considered unfavorable to said depart-
ment. None of the other employees with comparable positions
were law school graduates nor was attendance at law school
required of Frazee or his associates.
The tax court allowed a deduction for the law school
expenses on the ground that a legal education was "appro-
priate and helpful" in the performance of his duties with
the United States Air Force, even though Frazee candidly
admitted at the trial that "he had educational aspirations."
Interestingly, the court stated with respect to the taxpayer's
own admission that he had educational aspirations:
ample (10) of Rev. Rul. 60-97 printed in the Appendix B infra, which is
analogous.
3s22 CCH Tax Ct Men. 1086 (1963).
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We would take an unduly narrow view, and one not required
by respondent's regulations if we held that the mere presence of
general educational aspirations was sufficient to defeat the claimed
deductions. Of necessity, an individual must have some general
educational aspirations in order to complete a legal education at
night school while working full time at his regular employment. 4
In addition, the court noted that the mere fact that the
legal education enhances the taxpayer's chances for promo-
tion does not, of itself, establish that the primary reason
for acquiring the education is for a new position or sub-
stantial advancement which would result in a denial of the
deduction.
In F razee, the nature of the taxpayer's employment did
not require that he attend law school; the particular skills
required of the taxpayer did not necessitate a legal educa-
tion; the taxpayer's employer did not require a legal edu-
cation; it was not customary for the taxpayer's associates
to obtain a legal education, and it appears from the opinion
that the taxpayer candidly admitted that a purpose in
attending law school was to fulfill general educational as-
pirations. Although the taxpayer's educational pursuits were
laudable, it would seem clear that under the present regu-
lations, the expenses incurred in connection therewith were
not deductible. The taxpayer, in undertaking the legal educa-
tion, was fulfilling his general educational aspirations, and
at the same time qualifying for a new profession -that of a
lawyer, even though he may have remained employed in the
same position. As we have noted previously, many lawyers
do not actually practice law; yet, they enjoy the numerous
advantages and considerable prestige which the profession
offers. Taxpayers such as Frazee are not in a significantly
different classification.
In Louis Aronin,35 the taxpayer had voluntarily enrolled
as a law student at night and obtained his Bachelor of Laws
degree. Shortly after his admission to the Maryland Bar
his government rating was increased from GS-12 to GS-13.
34 Id. at 1088.
3520 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 909 (1961).
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The taxpayer stated that he was attending law school "in
order to improve my ability to perform my job of Labor
Management Relations Examiner which involves the in-
terpretation and administration of a Federal Act and legal
interpretations of said law." The court denied the deduction
reasoning that the expenses were personal in nature in that
they were not undertaken primarily for the purpose of
maintaining or improving skills required by the taxpayer
in his employment and they did not represent conditions
expressly required by the :NLRB in order to maintain the
taxpayer's salary, status or employment. Unlike the court
in Frazee, the court here reasoned that the taxpayer had
acquired a new skill or specialty.
In Frazee and Aronin, we again have two cases on
substantially similar facts reaching diametrically opposite
results. In both cases the taxpayers, while employed by the
Government sought law degrees and admission to the bar.
Both taxpayers had been employed with the Government for
a number of years prior to enrolling in law school and re-
mained with the Government after they completed their
legal studies. In both cases, as well, a law school course was
not required by their employers and it was not customary
for their associates to pursue law studies. Both cases were
tried in the tax court. Yet, one taxpayer received the full
deduction claimed while the other did not. This again points
up the lack of uniformity in the decisions regarding the
deductibility of educational expenses.
In another interesting group of cases, a number of
"patent agents" and "patent chemists" have claimed deduc-
tions for the law school expenses incurred in order for
them to become patent attorneys.
In Sandt & Hines v. Commissioner,86 the taxpayers were
research chemists. While so employed, they learned of
openings for patent chemists in the patents' division of
their employer. They left their positions as research chemists
and transferred to the patents and contracts division and
assumed the duties of patent chemists. Both enrolled in
38303 F2d 111 (3d Cw. 1962).
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the Temple University School of Law at night during the
school year following their transfers, and ultimately received
LL.B. degrees. On their income tax returns, both Sandt and
Hines claimed the entire expenses incurred in connection
with attending law school as ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense deductions. At the trial, the taxpayers claimed
that the primary purpose in attending law school was to
retain a position of employment with their employer. The
tax court, however, found that the primary purpose was to
obtain a new position, and denied the deductions. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
A similar result was reached in the case of Robert H.
Montgomery." A deduction for law school expenses was
denied a patent searcher whose duties were to determine
whether a present or prospective product would infringe
existing patents that were adversely held, to determine the
validity of adversely held patents, and to engage in the
preparation of patent applications. His duties did not require
a law degree or law school attendance and the only require-
ment for his employment was that he be a graduate engineer.
The tax court found that the educational expenses incurred
by the taxpayer were undertaken primarily to fulfill his
general educational aspirations, to obtain a new position
and to meet requirements for his intended specialty.
Likewise, even where evidence was introduced that legal
training was helpful tr one working as a "Patent Agent
Foreign" the deduction was disallowed. In the case of John
Lezdey 8 the taxpayer established also that after he had
completed law school he was promoted to "Patent Attorney."
The court denied the deduction, holding that the taxpayer
was merely completing a course of study undertaken earlier
which ultimately led to an LL.B. degree, admission to the
bar, and a new position - that of a "Patent Attorney."
Consistently, in David H. Pfeffer, 9 law school educa-
tion expenses incurred by a "patent agent" employed as a
"patent liaison engineer" were held not to be deductible.
3 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 599 (1964).
3823 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 485 (1964).
3922 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 785 (1963).
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Shortly after graduating from law school, Pfeffer left his
position as a "patent liaison engineer" and assumed a posi-
tion with a law firm. In Pfeffer, the tax court's opinion
contains the following statement which seems applicable
to all of the cases herein relating to the deduction of law
school expenses, and particularly to those cases such as Welsh
where the taxpayer actually engaged in a law practice after
completing his law course:
It is plain to us that petitioner intended to become a lawyer from
the beginning, and it is a matter of no consequence that many
tasks of a lawyer can also be performed by one who is not a
member of the bar. The point is that petitioner is a lawyer, that
he is associated with a law firm and practices law, and that he
attended law school in order to become a lawyer. His expenses
in that connection are not deductible 40
Although in a number of the cases analyzed herein, the tax-
payers did not actually engage in a law practice as such,
the fact is, they became lawyers and this was the acquisition
of a new profession.
In this connection it should be noted that in the recent
case of Williams v. United States," the court refused to
follow Sandt & Hines and the line of cases which have
followed that decision. In Williams, the taxpayer was hired
as a "trainee" for ultimate assignment as a patent attorney,
provided that he (1) attended law school, (2) maintained
a degree status at law school, (3) secured an LL.B. degree
in a prescribed course of study, (4) obtained admission to
the bar, and (5) gained admission to practice before the
Patent Office.
Williams enrolled in law school, subsequently received
his LL.B. degree and was admitted to the bar. After being
admitted his title was changed to "Patent Attorney." In-
terestingly, after being admitted to the bar, Williams prac-
ticed law "independently" and received income from his law
practice in addition to his salary as a patent attorney.
40Id. at 787.
4165-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9263 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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He claimed his entire law school expenses as a deduction
from his income taxes.
The court stated that Williams' purpose in obtaining
the legal education was two-fold: (1) fulfilling the require-
ments of his employer imposed as a condition to the reten-
tion of his position; and (2) seeking advancement to a new
position. The court held that the taxpayer's primary purpose
in obtaining the law school education was to retain his po-
sition as a "patent trainee." The full deduction claimed
was therefore, allowed by the court as an ordinary and
necessary business expense.
In Williams, as in the majority of the cases discussed
above, the taxpayer, after completing law school, became a
lawyer, which was a new profession. He was hired as a
"trainee" with the understanding that he would be required
to qualify in this new profession, and it appears from the
opinion that he would not have been hired had he not agreed
to do so. It is submitted that he did not study law to main-
tain and improve skills in a profession or position which
he already had. Williams had not fulfilled the basic quali-
fications for the position of patent attorney at the time
he was hired.,2 His law course was undertaken to qualify
for a new position.
Indeed, the court found as a fact that one of the reasons
why Williams attended law school was to "seek advance-
ment to a new position." As has previously been stated
throughout this article, the regulations expressly provide
that expenses incurred to qualify for a new position are
not deductible.
Further, it should be noted that in the instant case,
the taxpayer actually engaged in the "independent" practice
of law in addition to working as a patent attorney. It would
seem that the tax court's statement in Pfeffer, quoted above,
42 Regs. § 1.162-5(b) expressly provides that if the education is pursued
"in order to meet the minimum requirements for qualification or establish-
ment in his intended trade or business or specialty therein, the expense of
such education is personal in nature and therefore is not deductible." Ex-
ample (1) of Regs. § 1.162-5(e), contained in Appendix A infra, is ahalogous
to the facts in Williams. It seems clear from the regulations and the ex-
ample that "Williams type" educational expenses are not deductible. See
also Rev. Rul. 60-97 which is set forth in Appendix B infra.
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is particularly applicable in Williams. Certainly, Williams
attended law school in order to become a lawyer, and his
expenses in that connection should not be allowed as a
deduction under the regulations.
CONCLUSION
Clearly the lawyer should be allowed to deduct any
educational expenses which will help him to maintain and
improve his skills as a lawyer. However, there is little justi-
fication for the decisions which allow as a deduction the
expenses incurred in becoming a lawyer in the first instance.
Even assuming that the taxpayer entered law school with
the intention of remaining with the same employer, it cannot
be denied that upon being admitted to the bar, he qualified
for a new profession -that -of a lawyer. As a lawyer, he is
entitled to all of the privileges that any other practitioner
enjoys. He may join bar associations, and in all probability,
he is regarded by his family, friends, and associates as a
lawyer. Moreover, he may actually engage in an "indepen-
dent" practice such as the facts revealed in the Williams case.
Whether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed depends
upon legislative grace; and only as there is a clear provision there-
fore can any particular deduction be allowed. . . . Obviously
therefore, a taxpayer seeking a deduction must be able to point
to an applicable statute and show that he comes within its
terms.4 3
Those cases which have allowed a deduction for the
educational expenses incurred in becoming a lawyer cannot
be regarded as falling within the four corners of the statute
permitting a deduction for ordinary and necessary business
expenses.
In the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo:
Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the good
will of an old partnership. . . For many, they are the only
tools with which to hew a pathway to success. The money spent
43 New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
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in acquiring them is well and wisely spent. It is not an ordinary
expense of the operation of a business.4
APPENDiX A
§ 1.162-5. Expenses for education.
(a) Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are
deductible if they are for education (including research activities)
undertaken primarily for the purpose of:
(1) Maintaining or improving skills required by the tax-
payer in his employment or other trade or business, or
(2) Meeting the express requirements of a taxpayer's
employer, or the requirements of applicable law or
regulations, imposed as a condition to the retention
by the taxpayer of his salary, status or employment.
Whether or not education is of the type referred to in subparagraph
(1) of this paragraph shall be determined upon the basis of all the
facts of each case. If it is customary for other established members
of the taxpayer's trade or business to undertake such education, the
taxpayer will ordinarily be considered to have undertaken this
education for the purpose described in subparagraph (1) of this
paragraph. Expenditures for education of the type described in
subparagraph (2) of this paragraph are deductible under subpara-
graph (2) only to the extent that they are for the minimum edu-
cation required by the taxpayer's employer, or by applicable law
or regulations, as a condition to the retention of the taxpayer's
salary, status or employment. Expenditures for education other than
those so required may be deductible under subparagraph (1) of this
paragraph if the education meets the qualifications of subparagraph
(1). A taxpayer is considered to have made expenditures for edu-
cation to meet the express requirements of his employer only if the
requirement is imposed primarily for a bona fide business purpose
of the taxpayer's employer and not primarily for the taxpayer's
benefit, except as provided in the last sentence of paragraph (b)
of this section, in the case of teachers, a written statement from
an authorized official or school officer to the effect that the educa-
44Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115-16 (1933).
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tion was required as a condition to the retention of the taxpayer's
salary, status, or employment will be accepted for the purpose of
meeting the requirements of this paragraph.
(b) Expenditures made by a taxpayer for all his education are
not deductible if they are for education undertaken primarily for
the purpose of obtaining a new position or substantial advancement
in position, or primarily for the purpose of fulfilling the general
aspirations or other personal purposes of the taxpayer. The fact
that the education undertaken meets express requirements for the
new position or substantial advancement in position will be an
important factor indicating that the education is undertaken pri-
marily for the purpose of obtaining such position or advancement,
unless such education is required as a condition to the retention
by the taxpayer of his present employment. In any event if educa-
tion is required of the taxpayer in order to meet the minimum
requirements for qualification or establishment in his intended
trade or business or specialty therein, the expense of such educa-
tion is personal in nature and therefore is not deductible.
(c) In general, a taxpayer's expenditures for travel (including
travel while on a sabbatical leave) as a form of education shall be
considered as primarily personal in nature and therefore not
deductible.
(d) If a taxpayer travels away from home primarily to obtain
education the expenses of which are deductible under this section, his
expenditures for travel, meals and lodging while away from home
are deductible. However, if as an incident of such trip the taxpayer
engages in some personal activity such as sightseeing, social visiting
or entertaining, or other recreation, the portion of the expenses
attributable to such personal activity constitutes nondeductible per-
sonal or living expenses and is not allowable as a deduction. If
the taxpayer's travel away from home is primarily personal, the
taxpayer's expenditures for travel, meals, and lodging (other than
meals and lodging during the time spent in participating in de-
ductible educational pursuits) are not deductible. Whether a par-
ticular trip is primarily personal or primarily to obtain education
the expenses of which are deductible under this section depends
upon all the facts and circumstances of each case. An important
factor to be taken into consideration in making the determination
is the relative amount of time devoted to personal activity as com-
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pared with the time devoted to educational pursuits. Expenses in
the nature of commuters' fares are not deductible.
(e) The provisions of this section may be illustrated by the
following examples:
Example (1). A is employed by an accounting firm.
In order to become a certified public accountant he takes
courses in accounting. Since the education was undertaken
prior to the time A became qualified in his chosen profes-
sion as a certified public accountant, A's expenditures for
such courses and expenses for any transportation, meals,
and lodging while away from home are not deductible.
Example (2). B, a general practitioner of medicine,
takes a course of study in order to become a specialist in
pediatrics. C, a general practitioner of medicine, takes a
2-week course reviewing developments in several special-
ized fields, including pediatrics, for the purpose of carrying
on his general practice. B's expenses are not deductible be-
cause the course of study qualified him for a specialty
within his trade or business. C's expenses for his education
and any transportation, meals, and lodging while away
from home are deductible because they were undertaken
primarily to improve skills required by him in his trade
or business.
Example (3). D is required by his employer (or by
State law) either to read a list of books or to take certain
courses giving six hours academic credit every two years
in order to retain his position as a teacher. D fulfills the
requirement by taking the courses and thereby receives
an automatic increase in salary in his present position and
salary schedule. Also, as the result of taking the prescribed
courses, at the end of ten years, D receives a master's
degree and becomes automatically eligible for an additional
salary increase. Since D's purpose in taking the courses
was primarily to fulfill the educational requirement of his
employer, his expenses for such education and transporta-
tion, meals, and lodging while away from home are
deductible.
Example (4). The facts are the same as in example
(3) except that, due solely to a shortage of qualified teach-
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ers, D's employer does not enforce the prescribed educa-
tional requirements in that other teachers who do not fulfill
those requirements are retained in their positions. D's
expenses are nevertheless deductible.
Example (5). E, a high school teacher of physics in
order to improve skills required by him and thus improve
his effectiveness as such a teacher, takes summer school
courses in nuclear physics and educational methods. E's
expenses for such courses are deductible.
Example (6). F takes summer school courses in
order to improve skills iequired by him in his employment
as a teacher. As a result of taking such courses F receives
an in-grade increase in salary in his present position pur-
suant to a salary schedule established by the school system
for which he works. F's expenditures for such courses are
deductible.
Example (7). G, a graduate student at a university,
plans to become a university professor. In order to qualify
as a regular faculty member, G must obtain a graduate
degree. While taking the required graduate courses, G is
engaged in teaching at the university. G's expenses there-
fore are not deductible since he has not completed the
education required to become qualified as a regular faculty
member at the time he takes such courses.
Example (8). H, a self-employed tax consultant,
decides to take a 1-week course in taxation, which is offered
in City X, 500 miles away from his home. His primary
purpose in going to X is to take the course, but he also
takes a side trip to City Y (50 miles from X) for one day,
takes a sightseeing trip while in X, and entertains some
personal friends. H's transportation expenses to City X and
return to his home are deductible but his transportation
expenses to City Y are not deductible. H's expenses for
meals and lodging while away from home will be allocated
between his educational pursuits and his personal activities.
Those expenses which are entirely personal, such as sight-
seeing and entertaining friends, are not deductible to any
extent.
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Example (9). The facts are the same as in example
(8) except that H's primary purpose in going to City X
is to take a vacation. This purpose is indicated by several
factors, one of which is the fact that he spends only one
week attending the tax course and devotes five weeks en-
tirely to personal activities. None of H's transportation ex-
penses are deductible and his expenses for meals and lodg-
ing while away from home are not deductible to the extent
attributable to personal activities. His expenses for meals
and lodging allocable to the week attending the tax course
are, however, deductible.
APPENDIX B
Rev. Rul. 60-97
Guides concerning the Federal income tax treatment of
expenses incurred by taxpayers for education.
Advice has been requested concerning the Federal income tax
treatment of expenses incurred by taxpayers for education.
The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 here
pertinent are found in section 162(a) which states that in com-
puting taxable income, there shall be allowed as a deduction "all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." Among the items
representing business expenses are "traveling expenses (including
the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from
home in the pursuit of a trade or business."
Section 262 of the Code provides, however, with exceptions not
here material, that no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living,
or family expenses.
Regulations (section 1.162-5) were promulgated under section
162 of the Code in order to differentiate between expenditures for
education which constitute ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred in carrying on a business activity and those which are
personal in nature. The regulations also removed the uncertainties
as to the deductibility of educational expenses by employees as dis-
tinguished from self-employed persons. They make it clear that
both employees and self-employed individuals can deduct educational
expenses which qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
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The regulations provide that expenditures made by a taxpayer
for his education are deductible if they are for education undertaken
primarily for the purposes of (1) maintaining or improving skills
required by the taxpayer in his employment or other trade or busi-
ness, or (2) meeting the express requirements of a taxpayer's
employer, or the requirements of applicable law or regulations, im-
posed as a condition to the retention by the taxpayer of his salary,
status or employment. Taxpayers are entitled to deductions only if
they are engaged in a trade or business (whether self-employed
or engaged in the performance of services as an employee) and
have met at least the minimum requirements for qualification or
establishment in that trade or business. In determining what the
minimum requirements of a taxpayer's trade or business are, con-
sideration must be given to such factors as the requirements of the
taxpayer's employer (either present or prospective), the laws and
regulations of the particular jurisdiction, and the standards of
professional, trade and business groups.
A taxpayer who is not currently employed or is not otherwise
actively engaged in a trade or business is not entitled to a deduction
for the expenses of any education undertaken during such period
of unemployment or inactivity. Therefore, if a taxpayer who has
ceased to engage in employment or other business subsequently
undertakes education or training preparatory to resuming engage-
ment in such employment or other business, the cost of such educa-
tion is not deductible. A taxpayer will not be considered to have
ceased to engage in his employment or other business during an
off-duty season, when he is on vacation, or when he is on temporary
leave of absence. Thus, a teacher will not be considered to have
ceased to engage in his employment during the period between one
school term in which he was employed and the next consecutive
school term regardless of whether he was under a contract of em-
ployment during such intervening period.
Whether expenditures are for education undertaken primarily
for the purpose of "maintaining or improving skills" required by
the taxpayer in his employment or other trade or business must
be determined upon the basis of all the facts involved. The tests of
the regulations are framed to fit a wide variety of situations. In
order to satisfy any of these tests, if called upon to do so in
connection with the audit of a return or claim for refund, it is not
enough to assert or deny the purpose of the taxpayer in general
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terms. Rather, it is necessary that the taxpayer show his purpose
through specific facts. In this connection it will be necessary for him
to establish that the education does maintain or improve skills
required in his employment or other business. The skills "required"
by the taxpayer in his employment or other trade or business are
those which are appropriate, helpful, or needed.
If it is customary for other established members of the tax-
payer's trade or business occupying positions similar to that of
the taxpayer to undertake education of the type pursued by the
taxpayer, the taxpayer will be considered to have undertaken such
education for the purpose of maintaining or improving skills. The
further and overriding rule which must be applied in every case
is that even if the education maintains or improves skills required
by the taxpayer in his trade or business, the cost thereof will not
be deductible if the education is required of the taxpayer in order
to meet the minimum requirements for qualification or establish-
ment in his intended trade or business or -specialty therein. The
expense of such education is not deductible because it is personal
in nature.
Once a taxpayer has met minimum requirements for establish-
ment in his intended trade or business, the cost of education under-
taken primarily for meeting the express requirements of a taxpayer's
employer (or the requirements of applicable law or regulations)
imposed as a condition to retention of the taxpayer's salary, status
or employment is deductible. Generally, this is true even though a
new position, a substantial advancement, or qualification in a new
field may result. (See, however, the subdivision of this Revenue
Ruling entitled, "Complete course of study leading to qualification
or establishment," beginning on page 73.) However, the deduction
of expenses incurred for this purpose is limited to expenses for the
minimum education required as a condition to the retention of the
taxpayer's salary, status, or employment. Expenses for education
in excess of that necessary to retain the taxpayer's salary, status,
or employment may be deducted only if such excess education is
undertaken primarily for the purpose of maintaining or improving
skills required in the taxpayer's employment or other trade or
business.
The regulations prohibit the deduction of expenditures made
by a taxpayer for his education if they are for education undertaken
primarily for the purpose of obtaining a new position or substantial
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advancement in position, or primarily for the purpose of fulfilling
the general educational aspirations or other personal purposes of
the taxpayer. The fact that the education undertaken meets express
requirements for the new position or substantial advancement in
position is an important factor indicating that the education is
undertaken primarily for those purposes. If education is not neces-
sary to retention of position and it meets express requirements for
a new position or substantial advancement in position, the taxpayer
must show that his primary purpose in acquiring the education is
to maintain or improve skills required in his present employment
or other business. The taxpayer will be considered to have made
such a showing if it is customary for other established members of
the taxpayer's trade or business occupying positions similar to that
of the taxpayer to undertake such education.
Summarizing, therefore, it may be said that expenses volun-
tarily undertaken primarily for the purpose of maintaining or im-
proving skills required by a taxpayer in his employment or other
trade or business are deductible as well as those incurred primarily
because required as a condition to retention of his salary, status
or employment; that expenses incurred primarily for either of these
two purposes are deductible whether the taxpayer is self-employed
or is engaged in the performance of services as an employee; and
the fact that academic credit, a degree, a new job, or advancement
may result does not preclude a deduction so long as the education
is primarily undertaken for one of the two purposes specified in
the regulations as -causing the expenses to qualify for deduction.
Minimum Requirements for Qualification or Establishment
Section 1.162-5(b) of the regulations specifically provides that
"if education is required of the taxpayer in order to meet the
minimum requirements for qualification or establishment in his
intended trade or business or specialty therein, the expense of
such education is personal in nature and therefore is not deductible."
It therefore is necessary to determine in every case whether a tax-
payer has met these minimum requirements.
The following is a description of the application of this mini-
mum requirement rule to teachers and school administrators. These
taxpayers must meet both local and state requirements.
The state's minimum requirements for qualification or establish-
ment in his intended position have been met by a teacher or school
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administrator when he has acquired the education necessary to hold
a continuing certificate in that position. For the purposes of this
Revenue Ruling, a continuing certificate is one which need not be
renewed, is renewable or convertible on the basis of experience only,
or is renewable indefinitely by acquiring education which is not di-
rected toward required conversion to another type of certificate. In
other words, a teacher has met the state's minimum requirements
when he is eligible for a certificate and is not required to take addi-
tional education showing progress toward the attainment of another
type of certificate. The name or term applied to a certificate is not
controlling.
If a teacher who has a continuing certificate is required by his
employer, whether local board, district or school (public or private),
to meet other educational requirements for employment in his posi-
tion, he must meet these requirements before he will be considered
to be qualified or established in his position. A change of employers,
therefore, may require teachers as well as other taxpayers to meet
different minimum requirements. (See the subdivision of this
Revenue Ruling entitled, "Increased Requirements-Changed Du-
ties," infra).
Whether university and college faculty members have met the
minimum requirements for qualification or establishment in their
intended positions must be determined in the light of the governing
regulations of the various institutions. A university or college fac-
ulty member has met the minimum requirements for establishment
in his position when higher educational attainments are not required
of him as a condition of continuing with the institution as a faculty
member. (See discussion below, however, relative to increased re-
quirements.) If such a faculty member undertakes additional edu-
cation which he is not required to take in order to remain on the
faculty, he will be entitled to deductions provided the education
was undertaken for the purposes of maintaining or improving
skills required by the taxpayer in his position.
The regulations of universities and colleges often require faculty
members to attain certain levels of education either prior to appoint-
ment or within a specified period of time after, appointment. If an
individual is employed with the understanding that he must obtain
certain additional education within a specified period of time in order
to remain on the staff, expenses incurred for such education
represent expenses incurred in meeting minimum requirements
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for establishment in the taxpayer's intended position and are not
deductible. Thus, for example, if an individual is appointed as an
instructor in a college having a policy that within five years he
must acquire a master's degree and thus qualify as an assistant
professor in order to remain on the faculty of the institution, the
expenses incurred in earning the master's degree represent ex-
penses incurred in acquiring the minimum qualifications for estab-
lishment in his intended position and are not deductible.
Substantial Advancement
The regulations provide that expenditures made by a taxpayer
for his education are not deductible if they are for education under-
taken primarily for the purpose of obtaining a substantial advance-
ment in position. Example (6) contained in section 1.162-5(e) of
the regulations makes it clear that in the case of teachers an in-
grade increase in salary pursuant to a salary schedule does not
constitute a substantial advancement in position. A teacher who
incurs expenses for education which are otherwise deductible and,
as a result, receives an in-grade increase in salary need not show
that the education was not undertaken primarily for the purpose
of obtaining the in-grade increase. An "in-grade" increase is an
automatic step in a salary schedule for a specified level of education.
A shift from one step in a salary schedule for a specified level of
education (such as a bachelors degree) to the corresponding or
next higher step in a salary schedule for the next higher level of
education (i.e., a master's degree) will be treated as an in-grade
increase in salary and will not constitute a substantial advancement
in position.
Increased Requirements-Changed Duties
Once a taxpayer has met the minimum requirements for estab-
lishment in his intended position, expenses incurred in meeting
increased requirements thereafter established for that position are
deductible, provided the increased requirements are imposed pri-
marily for a bona fide business purpose of the employer. See the
next subdivision of this Revenue Ruling for an application of this
rule.
Also, in the case of an established taxpayer, expenses of addi-
tional education necessitated by a change of duties with the same
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employer (whether at the request of the taxpayer or his employer)
are deductible provided the new duties do not constitute a new
position and the cost of the education otherwise qualifies for deduc-
tion under the regulations. For example, if the new duties do
not constitute a new position and the taxpayer receives a substantial
increase in salary as a result of taking the additional education, the
cost of such education will be deductible provided the taxpayer can
show his primary purpose was to retain his position or improve re-
quired skills. In the case of an established teacher, a change of
duties with the same school district or other employer will not
constitute a new position if the duties involve the same general
type of work (for example, teaching as distinguished from admini-
strative duties) and if the teacher is not required to obtain a
different type of certificate (such as a change from an elementary
certificate to a secondary certificate).
Complete Course of Study Leading to Qualification or Establishnent
The regulations provide that if education is required of the
taxpayer in order to meet the minimum requirements for qualifica-
tion or establishment in his intended trade or business or specialty
therein, the expense of such education is personal in nature and
therefore is not deductible. If a taxpayer who is established in his
position undertakes education which is a part of a complete course
of study that the taxpayer intends to pursue, such as that required
to obtain a Bachelor of Laws degree, and such complete course of
study will lead to qualifying the taxpayer in a new trade or busi-
ness or specialty therein, it will be considered, for purposes of
this Revenue Ruling, that such education was undertaken to qualify
the taxpayer in such new trade or business or specialty. Accordingly,
the cost of such education will not be deductible. See example 10
below. However, a taxpayer may deduct the cost of courses in a
new field or specialty if they meet the tests of deductibility provided
in the regulations and provided they are not intended to be com-
bined with other courses so as to lead to qualification in that field
or specialty.
Except as provided in the next sentence, if an employee is
established in his position and thereafter he is required by his em-
ployer, for a bona fide business purpose, to undertake additional
education in order to retain his position, the cost of such education
will be deductible. However, if the education required by the em-
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ployer represents a complete course of study which will lead to
qualifying the taxpayer in a new trade or business or specialty
therein, it will be considered, for purposes of this Revenue Ruling,
that the requirement was imposed primarily for the benefit of the
employee and not primarily for a bona fide business reason of the
employer and, accordingly, the cost of such education will not be
deductible.
Key Questions
The following is the suggested order in which questions should
be resolved in determining the deductibility of expenses incurred
for education:
Has the taxpayer met the minimum requirements for
qualification or establishment in his intended position?
If "no," no deductions are allowable.
If "yes," is education undertaken primarily to meet
employer requirements to retain taxpayer's position?
If "yes," the taxpayer is entitled to deductions unless
(1) the education leads to qualifying the taxpayer in his
intended trade or business and taxpayer knew of this em-
ployer requirement before assuming his position with his
employer, or (2) the employer's requirement is imposed
primarily for the benefit of the taxpayer and not primarily
for a bona fide business purpose.
If "no," is it customary for other established members
of taxpayer's trade or business occupying positions similar
to that of the taxpayer to undertake education of the type
pursued by the taxpayer?
If "yes," the taxpayer is considered to have under-
taken education for the purpose of maintaining or improv-
ing needed skills and is entitled to deductions.
If "no," the taxpayer must show by other means that
his primary purpose was to maintain or improve needed
skills. If the education undertaken meets express require-
ments for a new position or substantial advancement, the
taxpayer must show that the education was not undertaken
primarily for the purpose of meeting those requirements.
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Where Deduction Is Reported on Return
The rules applicable to the deduction of business expenses in
general apply to expenses for education which qualify as business
expenses.
Under section 62 of the Code, expenses incurred by a self-
employed taxpayer for education are deductible on page 1 of Form
1040, U. S. Individual Income Tax Return, in computing his
adjusted gross income, if they meet the tests set forth above.
In the case of an employee, however, the nature of such ex-
penses will determine whether they are deductible on page i or
page 2 of Form 1040. An employee's traveling expenses (includ-
ing the cost of meals and lodging) while away from home over-
night, and transportation expenses (excluding the cost of meals and
lodging) not involving overnight travel, incurred in pursuing edu-
cational activities, the expenses of which are deductible, may be
claimed on page 1 of Form 1040 in computing adjusted gross in-
come. An employee's expenses for tuition, books, laboratory fees,
and similar items incurred in pursuing similar education activities
are likewise deductible in computing his adjusted gross income to
the extent his employer reimburses him for such expenses and
provided he reflects the amount of such reimbursement in his gross
income. See section 1.162-17 of the Income Tax Regulations relat-
ing to the reporting and substantiation of employees' expenses. His
unreimbursed expenditures for such tuition, books, laboratory fees,
and similar items are deductible on page 2 of the return, provided,
of course, the standard deduction is not claimed and the optional
tax table is not used.
Travel and Transportation Expenses
The following are the general rules for the deductibility of
travel and transportation expenses: (1) Commuting from a tax-
payer's place of abode to any business post situated within the
area which constitutes his principal or regular business location
constitutes a personal expense; (2) expenses of transportation in-
curred between business posts within the same area or incurred
in daily round trips between the general area which constitutes
his principal or regular business location and a minor or temporary
post of duty situated beyond that general area are deductible; and
(3) overnight traveling expenses (including the cost of meals and
[ VOL.. 39
1965 ] DEDUCTION OF EDUCATIONAL EXPENSE 283
lodging) necessarily incurred while carrying on a business activity
at a minor or temporary post of duty in a more distant location
where it is reasonably or economically impractical to live at "home"
constitute deductible traveling expenses. Rev. Rul. 190, C.B. 1953-2,
303; Rev. Rul. 55-109, C.B. 1955-1, 261.
In determining the deductibility of traveling and transportation
expenses incurred in connection with acquiring education at an
educational institution, the taxpayer may select the institution which
best serves his needs and he will not be denied a deduction solely
because attendance at the institution of his choice resulted in
greater expenditures than he would have made if he had attended
another institution. -This is true whether foreign or local universities
are attended. A factual determination must be made as to whether
the travel away from home was primarily to obtain education the
expenses of which are deductible or whether the travel was primar-
ily for personal reasons. See section 1.162-5(d) of the Income Tax
Regulations. If the relative amount of time devoted to personal
activities or some other factor suggests a trip is made primarily
for personal purposes, the taxpayer must be able to show that,
notwithstanding this fact, the travel was primarily to obtain the
education.
A taxpayer undertaking education during an off-duty period or
temporary leave of absence may deduct his expenses of travel, meals
and lodging in addition to tuition costs, fees, cost of books, etc., if
the expenses otherwise qualify for deduction and if there is a firm
understanding or obligation that the taxpayer will return to his
employment at the end of the off-duty period or the temporary leave
of absence.
In this connection, anticipated or actual presence for more than
a year at a particular location strongly tends to indicate "indefinite"
as distinguished from "temporary" presence there. In the event
a taxpayer undertakes education requiring absence from his duties
and business post for an indefinite period, he will not be considered
as traveling away from "home" so as to be entitled to deduct ex-
penses incurred for travel, meals and lodging. However, tuition,
fees, cost of books and other necessary items may be deductible,
provided the education is of the type giving rise to deductions.
The following examples demonstrate the application of the rules
contained in this Revenue Ruling:
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Example (1). A fifth-grade teacher has had four
years of college study which for many years has been
the minimum state requirement for a continuing certificate
for such teachers. The state changes its requirements for
such certificate. New fifth-grade teachers are required to
have five years of college study when hired and fifth-grade
teachers already employed are given five years within which
to acquire the fifth year of college study. Fifth-grade teach-
ers already employed who had previously met the require-
ments for a continuing certificate are entitled to deductions
for expenses incurred in meeting the increased require-
ments.
Example (2). Mr. B. is a teacher in the seventh
grade of a school system organized on the 8-4 plan (8
years elementary and 4 years high school). He has a con-
tinuing elementary certificate. The system is reorganized
to the 6-3-3 plan (6 years elementary, 3 years junior high,
and 3 years senior high school). Mr. B is to continue to
teach seventh-grade pupils who will now be attending
junior high school in the reorganized system, but he must
obtain a secondary certificate. He must obtain additional
courses to qualify for such certificate. Mr. B's expenses
incurred in obtaining this additional education are deduc-
tible even though he obtains a different type of certificate,
because he is merely meeting increased educational require-
ments imposed by his employer for the same position.
Example (3). Miss D, a first-grade teacher in School
District X wishes to become a sixth-grade teacher in the
same school district. This school district requires all ele-
mentary school teachers to have a certain number of college
credits and an elementary certificate. A sixth-grade teacher
must have certain courses not required of a first-grade
teacher. Miss D takes the three additional courses specifi-
cally required to qualify her as a sixth-grade teacher and
is transferred. No new certificate is involved. Since Miss
D has the same employer, her duties involve the same
general type of work, and no new type of certificate is
involved, she is entitled to deduct the cost of the addi-
tional courses.
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Example (4). A taxpayer engaged in teaching second
grade does not possess a degree but has a teacher's cer-
tificate which, under state law, is renewable indefinitely by
periodic acquisition of a specified number of academic
credits without progressing toward the attainment of an-
other type of certificate. Such a certificate is a continuing
certificate and indicates for purposes of this Revenue Rul-
ing that the taxpayer has met the state's minimum require-
ments for qualification in his position. No further local
requirements are imposed on the taxpayer. In addition to
undertaking study required for renewal of his certificate,
the taxpayer, primarily for maintaining or improving
needed skills, pursues study which leads to a degree. The
taxpayer is entitled to deduct the cost of the voluntary
education (which leads to a degree) as well as that re-
quired to renew his certificate.
Example (5). A high school teacher of mathematics
who has a continuing high school certificate is advised by
his employer that he must transfer to fill a vacancy in the
science department and that this transfer will necessitate
his taking two specified courses in science. The teacher
takes these two courses and receives another continuing
high school certificate reflecting this fact (or his certificate
is endorsed to show this fact). This case represents a
change of duties in the same position and does not repre-
sent qualifying for a new position. Therefore, the expenses
for the two courses are deductible. In the case of such a
transfer at the request of the teacher, the expenses are,
for the same reasons also deductible.
Example (6). School District A in State Y requires
that seventh-grade teachers have at least a bachelor's de-
gree. Miss S, with a bachelor's degree, is employed by this
school district. She accepts employment as a seventh-grade
teacher in the same State but in School District C which
requires its seventh-grade teachers to have at least a
master's degree. Miss S is given two years within which
to acquire a master's degree. In undertaking the required
education, Miss S is meeting minimum requirements for
qualification in a new position. The expenses of such edu-
cation are, accordingly, not deductible.
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Example (7). A fourth-grade teacher in School Dis-
trict W undertakes education which maintains and improves
his skills as a fourth-grade teacher and also meets the
express educational requirements to qualify him as a prin-
cipal in that school district. The education is not required
as a condition to the retention of his salary, status or em-
ployment and is not of a type customarily undertaken by
other established fourth-grade teachers. Since the educa-
tion meets the express requirements for a new position, the
taxpayer will be entitled to a deduction only if he can
show that the education was undertaken primarily for the
purpose of maintaining or improving skills required in
his position and not primarily to secure the new position.
Example (8). A fifth-grade teacher holding a con-
tinuing certificate in State Y accepts employment as a fifth-
grade teacher in State Z. State Z requires fifth-grade teach-
ers to have a fifth year of college study in order to be
eligible for a continuing certificate whereas State Y re-
quired only four years of college study for such a cer-
tificate. Since the teacher has only four years of college
study, she is given a certificate by State Z which is re-
newable annually for five years, at the end of which time
she must be eligible for the continuing certificate. She
undertakes a fifth year of college work. Expenses incurred
in acquiring the education necessary for the continuing
certificate in State Z are incurred in meeting the minimum
requirements for qualification in a new position and are not
deductible.
Example (9). Mr. G is employed as an instructor in
a college where instructors and assistant professors are
appointed annually or for a specified period not to exceed
three years. A person is not permitted to be retained by the
college at the rank of instructor for more than five years.
An individual may continue as a faculty member without
progressing beyond the rank of assistant professor. Mr. G
undertakes education which will enable him to qualify as an
assistant professor. The expenses of such education are
incurred in meeting minimum requirements for establish-
ment in his intended position and are, accordingly, not
deductible.
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Example (10). A trust officer in a bank undertakes
to study law. The knowledge of the law will be helpful
in discharging his duties. His employer does not require
him to engage in such studies. He registers for the entire
regular curriculum leading to a bachelor of laws degree.
Since the taxpayer is pursuing. a complete course of educa-
tion in law which will lead toward qualifying him in that
field, in which he has not previously qualified, his expenses
for such education are considered to have been incurred
for the purpose of qualifying in that new field and are,
therefore, not deductible. Also, if the bank imposes upon
the taxpayer, as a condition to the continued retention of
his position with it, the requirement that he pursue a com-
plete law course, the cost of such education is not de-
ductible because the requirement is considered to be imposed
primarily for the employee's benefit and not primarily for a
bona fide business purpose of the employer.
Example (11). A teacher who lives in City R teaches
school in City T. During the summer he undertakes in
City R education the expenses of which qualify for deduc-
tion. The teacher regularly spends his summers at his resi-
dence and would be there regardless of whether he attends
school. His expenditures for meals or lodging are not de-
ductible because they constitute personal living expenses.
His expenses incurred for transportation between his resi-
dence and the school attended are in the nature of com-
muting expenses and also are not deductible. Expenditures
for tuition, books, fees, etc., are deductible as education
expenses to the extent provided in the regulations.
